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Many animal and human societies exhibit hierarchical structures with different degrees of steepness. 
Some of these societies also show cooperative behavior, where cooperation means working together 
for a common benefit. However, there is an increasing evidence that rigidly enforced hierarchies lead 
to a decrease of cooperation in both human and non-human primates. In this work, we address this 
issue by means of an evolutionary agent-based model that incorporates fights as social interactions 
governing a dynamic ranking, communal work to produce a public good, and norm internalization, 
i.e. a process where acting according to a norm becomes a goal in itself. Our model also includes the 
perception of how much the individual is going to retain from her cooperative behavior in future 
interactions. The predictions of the model resemble the principal characteristics of human societies. 
When ranking is unconstrained, we observe a high concentration of agents in low scores, while a few 
ones climb up the social hierarchy and exploit the rest, with no norm internalization. If ranking is 
constrained, thus leading to bounded score differences between agents, individual positions in the 
ranking change more, and the typical structure shows a division of the society in upper and lower 
classes. In this case, we observe that there is a significant degree of norm internalization, supporting 
large fractions of the population cooperating in spite of the rank differences. Our main results are 
robust with respect to the model parameters and to the type of rank constraint. We thus provide a 
mechanism that can explain how hierarchy arises in initially egalitarian societies while keeping a large 
degree of cooperation.
In nature, animals often benefit from living in groups due to reduced predation risk and increased availability of 
mates. At the same time, group living can result in strong competition for critical resources. When unfamiliar 
individuals find themselves in a group, they can compete violently initially, but then their competition can subdue 
once stable dominance-subordinate relationships form. Dominance hierarchies are found in many different social 
animals, including hens, cows, fish, and crabs, rats, primates and insects, especially wasps and  bumblebees1–9. 
Among different dominance patterns, the most typical structure is a linear hierarchy known as a classical peck-
ing  order10,11. Linear hierarchies are formed both in nature and laboratory in a vast range of species, including 
humans. Two main hypotheses have been proposed to explain linear hierarchies: they arise from differences in the 
intrinsic attributes of animals, or they result from the dynamics of social  interaction1,12–14. Several mathematical 
 models15–21, suggest that dominance orders in animal societies could indeed result from a self-organizing process 
through a double reinforcement mechanism: winners increase their probability of winning, and losers theirs 
of losing. In addition, some agent-based  models22,23 have shown that as the intensity of aggression increases, 
the double reinforcement mechanism may cause an egalitarian society to change into a despotic one. Relevant 
works in this context also include the papers by Ben-Naim and  Redner24,25 and by Bonabeau et al.15,26,27 to which 
we will come back below.
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Social structure, whether it results from dominance interactions or from any other mechanism, has a strong 
impact on the cooperative behavior of  individuals28–37. For our present purposes, we understand cooperation as 
working together to achieve a common goal or obtain some  benefit37,38. Note that we do not restrict ourselves to 
social dilemma situations, in so far as working together might be more beneficial than doing it alone, and our 
results are therefore quite general. In the case of nonhuman primates, the characteristics of dominance hierar-
chies strongly affect cooperative outcomes, with steep hierarchies generally reducing cooperation. For example, 
in chimpanzees, known to live in basically linear hierarchies, cooperation is  weak33,39 while species with more 
relaxed hierarchies, such as cottontop tamarins, are much more  cooperative32,33,35. Much less is known about the 
interplay of hierarchical structure and cooperative behavior in humans, but there is an experimental evidence that 
steep hierarchies also result in lower  cooperation40 and that less steep hierarchies preserve  it41. Other theoretical 
analyses have shown that dominant individuals (e.g., leaders with higher motivation or strength) can act seem-
ingly altruistically in between-group conflicts—expending more effort and having lower reproductive success—
than their subordinate group-mates42–45. In this context, an open question is how can large-scale cooperative 
societies arise if a strong hierarchical structure is present and sustained by physical or economic interactions.
A crucial point in the discussion above is the fact that human behavior is more complex than animal behavior. 
Part of this complexity is that human behavior is affected by norms and values that are transmitted culturally. A 
social norm is a set of behaviors that one is expected to follow in a specific context, and expects others to follow 
in a given social  situation46,47. Social norms can play a fundamental role to coordinate aspects of social behavior, 
but they arise and evolve as a result of individual behaviors, expectations, and interactions with  others48,49. Thus, 
humans learn the expected behavior for each specific context—which means they act according to prevalent 
norms—from sources such as family, via education and religion, information sources including media or books, 
and from interaction with and observation of others. In some cases, norms become internalized: they are then 
an end in themselves instead of a tool to simplify tasks or help in choosing the proper behavior to avoid social 
punishment. This internalization process is reminiscent of imitation and imprinting, that has been observed, 
e.g., in species of birds and  mammals50. Adherence to the associated norms and the corresponding behavior are 
subsequently reinforced by approval from others, rewards, and punishment when one fails to follow the norm.
In this paper, we study a model with two stages: first individuals attempt to solve a collective action problem 
and then they engage in dyadic conflicts over shares of the collectively produced resource. These dyadic fights, 
in turn, modify the dominance rank of the involved individuals and, as a consequence, their future decisions. 
Norm internalization is included in the picture through a function that individuals optimize when choosing 
their behavior, and evolves through differential reproduction according to payoffs received. Our model can be 
understood as a combination of the ideas on norm internalization and collective action in Refs.48,49 with the 
double reinforcement mechanism in Ref.25 As we discuss in detail below, we have found that the interplay of these 
two features gives rise to cooperative, hierarchical societies starting from an egalitarian situation.
Model
Model setup. Our model considers of S individuals living in groups of constant size n (a summary of the 
model parameters and attributes can be found in Table 1). Each individual can interact only with other individu-
als in her group. Generations are discrete and non-overlapping, and consist of Q rounds with three stages: collec-
tive action, fights over resources, and strategy revision. Reproduction takes place at the end of each generation. 
Every individual has a series of attributes that can evolve over time:
• An attribute which measures the score (position in the social scale): rk ∈ Z.
• A binary attribute xi , 0 or 1, indicating whether the individual cooperates or not in the collective action.
• An attribute which measures norm internalization: η ∈ R , with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 , where the norm is to cooperate in 
the collective action. Let us note that this attribute is a property of the individual, and that in general it dif-
Table 1.  Variables, parameters and attributes of the model and their meanings.
n Group size
G Number of groups
S = nG Number of individuals in the society
T Number of rounds the whole society lasts
Q Rounds that every generation lasts
e Error rate of optimization
v How much the cooperation is valued in the utility function
xi Dichotomous variable: ith individual’s cooperation in collective action
ri Discrete variable: ith individual’s score
ηi Ability of the ith individual to internalize the norm
µ Probability to revise the strategy
πCA Resource from the collective action
π∗ Accumulated resources
copt Cost of optimizing the payoffs in the utility function
cint Cost of internalizing the norm in the utility function
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fers from one individual to the next. In contrast with the previous two parameters, this one does not change 
during the evolution of an individual, being modified only at the reproduction phase as discussed below.
At the beginning of the simulations, the binary attribute x, describing the first decision of the individual, is 
randomly selected 0 or 1 with a 50% probability. Hence, the mean value for the cooperation at the beginning 
of each round is 0.5. The initial values for η , the sensitivity to the norm, follow a uniform random distribution 
between 0 and 0.05, implying very little norm internalization at the beginning of the simulation. Scores are all 
set to 0 at the beginning of the simulation, so all individuals are equal. Let us know go in detail through the steps 
of the model dynamics.
Evolution. Model evolution consists of collective action, fights, computation of the utility function for the 
individuals, subsequent revision of strategies, computation of fitness and reproduction (see Fig. 1).
Collective action. In this stage, each individual cooperates or not in the collective action to obtain a resource. 
When cooperating ( xi = 1 ), each individual makes an effort spending an amount c of accumulated payoffs. The 
aggregated resource obtained from all the individuals’ efforts is multiplied by a factor b and then shared equally 
among all group members, irrespective of whether they have collaborated or not. The payoff from the collective 
action for each individual k is calculated as
The function P(X) gives the normalized value of the resource: P(X) = X/X̄ , where X is the total effort of the 
group to which the individual belongs to, and X̄ the mean effort of cooperation over all groups, while b is the 
multiplier of the collective effort and c is the cost of cooperating. This is the first ingredient of the model we 
take from Ref.48.
Fights. In this second stage, dyadic conflicts may occur among randomly chosen individuals from the same 
group. In these conflicts, the contestants attempt to take each others’ share of the resource. We assume that the 
individual whose score is higher wins the fight 90% of the times, otherwise she loses. While this may seem a very 
extreme choice, we stress that we have tried other possibilities, including making the probability of a win depend-
ent on the rank difference with very similar results. We decided to keep this simple choice for computational 
speed and convenience. For every individual and every round, we pick an opponent at random from the rest of 
the group the agent belongs to. In this manner, on average every agent is in two fights per rounds, is in at least 
one fight, and can be in up to n− 1 fights. The winner increases her score by one unit and takes the loser’s last 










 , while the loser’s score decreases by one unit 






 . Payoffs after every round are accumulated, so each agent has an 
amount of resource π∗ , which accounts for all the payoffs that the agent manages to keep along with her history. 
In this manner, πCA is used in the strategy update process, and π∗ is taken into account in the evolutionary pro-
cess afterward. Note that there is no hierarchy between groups: groups provide a setup for collective action and 
for an additional component of fitness via group selection.
Utility function and norm internalization. We introduce a continuous norm internalization attribute, η , geneti-
cally controlled by a single locus with a continuum of  alleles48. The attribute η is constant over the individual’s 
life and changes only through random mutations during reproduction. With this attribute, the utility function 
uη for the ith individual is computed as
π
(k)
CA = bP(X)− cx.
u(i)η (xi) = (1− ηi)F(ri)π
(i)
+ vηixi ,
Figure 1.  Model flow.
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where π(i) is the expected payoff for the ith individual, computed via myopic optimization. The utility function 
thus has two components: a purely material contribution, the first term in the equation above, and another one 
that arises from the satisfaction of the individual with her behavior through a norm internalization process. When 
η = 0 , the individual is undersocialized and only wants to maximize her payoff from the collective action, not 
caring about the norm. If 0 < η < 1 , following the norm will be a part of the individual’s preference, contributing 
to the individual’s utility along with the payoff. Individuals with η = 1 will be oversocialized, do not care about 
their material payoff, their utility arising simply from following the norm. The parameter v defines the maximum 
value of cooperating. So far, this is the same as the utility function of Ref.48. For the purposes of the present 
paper, we introduce an additional, conflict-related ingredient, namely a function F. Specifically, we assume that 
individuals are aware of their rank in the group and about the possibility of future fights. In this case, low-rank 
individuals are expected to discount their future resource because they might lose it to stronger individuals. That 
is, we assume that individuals are capable of certain  foresight44,45. This is captured in a heuristic way by function 
F(r) = 1/(1+ exp(−γ r)) , where r is the score of the individual and γ is a parameter controlling the steepness 
of the curve (we will set γ = 0.5 ). Function F thus changes between 0 and 1. It can also be viewed as capturing 
relative differences in valuation of the collective goods by individuals of different  rank42,43.
Strategy revision. After the collective action stage, each individual can revise her strategy with probability µ , 
which measures the speed of the evolution. The approach we have chosen is to optimize the utility function via 
myopic optimization, i.e., pondering different possible actions while keeping all others’ decisions the same as 
in the previous round. In case an individual does revise her strategy, with probability 1− e an action x will be 
chosen such that uη is maximum. Otherwise, a random selection of x is selected with probability e.
Fitness. In this stage, the ith individual’s fitness, wi , is defined by setting wi = 1+ π∗/Qgen − copt(1− η)− cintη . 
Here, π∗ denotes the accumulated payoffs, π∗ =
∑
j πCA,j +�j , the sum running over all rounds, with j being 
the the quantities earned or lost in each round j. The parameter copt measures the cost of optimizing the payoffs 
instead of following the norm, and cint measures the cost of internalizing the norm.
Reproduction. Finally, reproduction is implemented proportionally to the individual’s fitness and the group’s 
collective effort. Each new group in the next generation will be descendant of one of the previous with prob-
ability proportional to the collective effort of the group, P, across Q rounds. Within each group, n parents will 
be chosen with probability proportional to their fitness, yielding n descendants. One individual can be chosen 
multiples times to yield descendants. Each descendant is subject to a random mutation on the attribute η . Off-
spring production is followed by random dispersal of half of the offspring, interpreted as females. The strategy 
revision, fitness, and reproduction steps, which are the ones introducing evolutionary dynamics in the individu-
als’ behavior, are taken from  reference48.
In summary, our model combines the idea of fights feeding back into a hierarchical structure from Refs.15,25 
with the participation in cooperative tasks and the possibility of social norm internalization from Refs.42,48, from 
where we have also taken the evolutionary dynamics for our simulations. We now turn to the discussion of the 
insights gained with this proposal on the arising of cooperative, structured societies.
Results
In the following, we present the results of agent-based simulations of our model. We have considered two types 
of scores: one in which they can take any value, and another one in which they are restricted within an interval of 
integer values. Below we discuss the main features of our model, namely the final distributions for the scores, the 
payoffs and their relationship with the scores, the amount of cooperators, and the norm internalization process. 
Given the large number of parameters of the model, we vary those that are more relevant to our research ques-
tion, keeping the rest unchanged. Specifically, the parameters we keep constant are the following: T = 10,000 , 
Q = 40 , G = 500 , e = 10% , b = 1 , c = 1 , v = 1 and µ = 75% , and copt = cint = 0.1 . We choose similar parameters 
to those from Ref.48 to be able to compare the results of both models as needed.
Unconstrained model. In the unconstrained model an individual’s score can increase and decrease with-
out any restrictions, without upper and lower bounds for r. If we identify the score with somewhat similar to 
a physical force, this is a somewhat unrealistic situation, but it will allow us to gain some first insights on the 
outcome of our simulations.
Figure 2 presents results for small groups (n = 8) , aggregating over all groups. The score distribution is 
(almost) symmetrical with respect to r = 0 , whereas the higher the score, the higher the accumulated payoffs. 
For negative scores, the dependence of the payoff on the score is weaker, but for positive scores, payoffs increase 
rapidly with score, as can be seen from the plot. Thus, individuals are more or less evenly distributed among 
scores, but half of the population, those with negative scores, have significantly fewer payoffs than the rest: As 
can be seen, the highest-ranked individuals may have substantial payoff differences among them, whereas the 
lowest-ranked individuals have more homogeneous payoffs and similar to those with r = 0 . The reason for this 
is that individuals who won in the first rounds saw their scores increased, while those who lost were relegated 
to negative scores. These fundamental differences are subsequently amplified by the positive feedback loop à 
la  Bonabeau15 ,leading to a ranking of agents with positions stable in time, i.e., there is no social mobility at all. 
Hence, subsequent evolution does not affect the score distribution, but does affect payoffs: Individuals with larger 
scores have been winning many fights, and as a consequence, they have accumulated more payoff.
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Having seen that the fight mechanism does lead to a stable hierarchical structure in the society correlated 
with payoffs, we can now focus on our main question, namely the interplay of hierarchy, cooperativeness, and 
social norm internalization. In Fig. 2 we can observe that the cooperation value per round is around 50% , with 
the other half of the population defecting in the collective action. This can be interpreted as half of the population 
being oppressed by the other half: exploited individuals (those with negative scores) cooperate in the collective 
action and those exploiting them (having positive scores) reap their payoffs. Indeed, low ranked individuals, 
with a very slim chance to defeat higher ranked ones, must cooperate to get some payoff, which they keep when 
they are not picked for a fight and defeated. This agrees with the results in the score histogram, where we observe 
that the top half part of the population is the one not cooperating (not following the norm, choosing x = 0 ) and 
the bottom half is the one contributing to the collective action (following the norm, x = 1 ). In addition, there is 
very little internalization of the norm, mostly because those who might be better off by internalizing the norm 
in their utility function have very low fitness and practically never reproduce. Of course, a few lower-ranked 
individuals do show norm internalization, with values around η = 0.3 , but these are clearly not the general case.
The aggregate results we have just discussed describe well the evolution of individual groups. Section S1 in 
the SI shows examples of simulation results for individual groups. In brief, what we observe is that the division 
in high-ranked agents that do not follow the norm and low-ranked agents that do takes place in most groups, 
albeit subject to a degree of noise as sometimes, for instance, there is an agent that is high-ranked and follows 
the norm (cf. Fig. S1b). In any event, the fraction of mismatched agents is always low. Similarly, the correlation 
between score and payoff applies at each individual group, with a small degree of noise. At the same time, agents 
with more probability to reproduce and pass offspring to the next generation are those with higher scores (cf. 
Figs. S5 and S6). We can thus be confident that the aggregate results are a good picture of what happens in indi-
vidual groups, which are the units whose social structure is relevant.
For larger groups, namely n = 24 , there are two main differences with the results reported so far: First, the 
score distribution changes and, second, the average cooperation level follows a different behavior. Regarding the 
aggregate score distribution, for groups with 24 individuals, we cannot say that the scores are evenly distributed 
as before. The distribution is more similar to a Gaussian, with many agents in the middle zone and only a few of 
them with extreme (positive or negative values). This is probably due to the length of the lifetime of the group, 
which is the time scores have to evolve. Having more individuals means that more fights would be needed to 
organize them in a more linear form. As for the cooperation level, at every generation it increases from the 
initial random level at 50% up to ∼ 90% , and then decreases to the initial value, around 50% , jumping again 
Figure 2.  Simulations for unconstrained scores, small groups ( n = 8 ). Top left: histograms of scores aggregated 
over all groups. Blue indicates free riders (that do not follow the norm of cooperating), red indicates norm 
followers (cooperators). Top right: payoff as a function of the score. Line is the result of a linear regression. 
Bottom left: average fraction of cooperators as a function of time. Bottom right: average value of the norm 
internalization attribute as a function of time.
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at the next restart of the population as the ranking between agents sets in. There are no changes regarding the 
internalization level of the norm, which is similar to the previous case and for similar reasons, as well as with 
respect to the relationship between the payoffs and the scores. Therefore, our main conclusion is that also in 
larger groups there is no promotion of cooperation and the norm does not become internalized. On the other 
hand, as with small groups, results for individual groups are very similar to those reported for the aggregate, cf. 
Figs. S2, S4 and S6 in the SI.
Exogenously constrained model. In this section, we consider a slightly more realistic version of our 
model, in which scores are restricted to the interval [0, n], n being the group size. This constraint is imposed 
externally, hence the name ‘exogenously constrained’; we will consider below another variant of the model in 
which scores decay with time resulting in an endogenous constraint of their values. As we will see, constraining 
scores gives rise to significant changes with respect to the unconstrained version.
Figure 3 shows the score distribution, in which the majority of individuals end up in the maximum and the 
minimum, with few agents occupying intermediate scores. This occurs because as the system evolves, fights won 
(respectively, lost) feedback on score, leading to higher (respectively, lower) scores, pushing individuals to the 
maximum (respectively, minimum) possible values. On the other hand, having many individuals in the lowest 
and highest rankings leads to a much lower impact of score on payoffs, as shown in Fig. 3, where no significant 
relationship between score position and payoff is observed. The reason for this is that at both extremes of the 
hierarchy there are many individuals with the same score, and fights between them lead to random results. This 
is in stark contrast with the unconstrained case, where the large differences in score decided practically every 
fight and induced a correlation with payoffs.
As can be seen from Fig. 3, cooperation level starts at around 50% , the initial random assignment of cooper-
ation-defection in each new generation, and rapidly increases a high value. Subsequently, it oscillates between 
70 and 90%. It is important to note that the inset of the plot corresponds to the last 1,000 rounds of evolution, 
where the mean value of the norm has reached a value around 0.4. as also shown in Fig. 3. Indeed, contrary to 
the unconstrained model, we find that the norm is internalized to a high value, thus increasing the cooperation 
level to high values. At the level of individual groups, we observe that the small fraction of individuals who do 
Figure 3.  Simulations for exogenously constrained scores, small groups ( n = 8 ). Top left: histograms of scores 
aggregated over all groups. Blue indicates free riders (that do not follow the norm of cooperating), red indicates 
norm followers (cooperators). Top right: payoff as a function of the score. Line is the result of a linear regression. 
Bottom left: average fraction of cooperators as a function of time. Bottom right: average value of the norm 
internalization attribute as a function of time.
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not follow the norm can be anywhere in the hierarchy, most likely because their small number makes them not 
very relevant in terms of the dynamics of the society.
For the exogenously constrained model, when we go down to the level of individual groups, there is a larger 
variability in behaviors, still within the same overall picture. There may be low-ranked agents who do not cooper-
ate or, on the contrary, cooperative agents with the highest rank, cf. Figs. S7 (a) and (b) in the SI. The most impor-
tant point to notice with respect to the individual groups of size n = 8 is that agents have a fitness distribution 
that is not correlated with their position in the hierarchy (cf. Fig. S11). This arises because the limits to the scores 
allow for larger mobility of the agents within the scores: high-ranked agents at one time may become low-ranked 
after a few, unlucky rounds. We have confirmed that this is indeed the case by checking the evolution in time of 
the scores (cf. representative examples in Figs. S13a). In turn, the fact that agents spend time in low scores leads 
to an increase of the norm internalization attribute, as we have observed in the aggregate. We believe that this 
mobility is the reason for the increased cooperation and norm internalization found in the aggregate (cf. Fig. 3). 
Indeed, as agents spend part of the lifetime of their group in lower scores, they generally cooperate and their 
degree of norm internalization increases. Subsequently, the small differences in payoff between higher-ranked 
and lower-ranked agents makes them reproduce with similar frequencies, allowing for the norm to continue 
internalizing in the next generation.
As with the unconstrained model, the outcome of the simulations changes again when the group size 
increases. This is shown in Fig. 4, where it can be noticed that the score distribution is similar to the previous 
case, with an even more bimodal character, but now the payoff distribution is more clearly dependent on the 
score, most likely due to the fact that there are more individuals and the range of possible scores is larger. The 
fact that now the payoffs depend more on the score leads to a situation with less cooperation and less norm 
internalization: Indeed, cooperation tends to the same values as in the unconstrained model: the dynamics fol-
lows the same pattern as in the case of small groups, but now the decay in each generation reaches values close 
to 50%. We also observe that the norm internalization achieves lower values, though still more significant than 
in the constrained model. This change has another consequence, namely that we go back to a situation in which 
high ranked individuals do not follow the norm while low ranked ones do as in the case of the unconstrained 
model. For the case of large, individual groups, the phenomenon of mobility within scores is quite less marked, 
mostly because now agents can have a larger range of scores, in agreement with the fact that there is less norm 
internalization and higher dependence of the payoff on the scores.
Figure 4.  Simulations for exogenously constrained scores, large groups ( n = 24 ). Top left: histograms of scores 
aggregated over all groups. Blue indicates free riders (that do not follow the norm of cooperating), red indicates 
norm followers (cooperators). Top right: payoff as a function of the score. Line is the result of a linear regression. 
Bottom left: average fraction of cooperators as a function of time. Bottom right: average value of the norm 
internalization attribute as a function of time.
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Endogenously constrained model. For the sake of making our model more realistic, we now con-
sider another version in which scores decrease following a certain rule. While this decay does not impose any 
hard bound to the score values, it effectively leads to a constrained range for them, hence the name ‘endog-
enously constrained’ model. This version consists of the same stages as before (collective action, conflicts, and 
reproduction) plus an additional one, the time evolution of the scores, which obeys the following dynamics: 
rt+1 = (1− )rt +�r , with 0 ≤  ≤ 1 , rounding rt+1 to the closest integer value. This rule implies that, in the 
absence of any interaction, scores decrease to a fraction of their initial value ((1− )rt) , whereas the results 
of the fights affect them through the term (�r) . Consistently with the previous versions of our model, we set 
r = ±1 , depending on whether an individual wins, +1 , or loses, −1 , a fight. This update rule can be interpreted 
as follows: when the value of  is low, the next competitive score will be close to the previous one, and the ben-
efits of scaling in the ranking by increasing one’s score through fighting last longer. When the value of  is high, 
every new score will be closer to r = 0 , making the society more egalitarian every round and strongly limiting 
the score benefits in time. Thus, we have a new parameter  , whose effect we consider below.
Figure 5 collects the results for the endogenously constrained model in small groups, showing that, as we 
have just discussed, the higher  the more egalitarian the society, to the point that for  = 0.75 only three dif-
ferent scores exist. The structure of the society is different from that of the exogenously constrained model, in 
the sense that now we observe that most individuals concentrate in intermediate scores and only a few of them 
have extreme (positive or negative) values. At the same time, cooperation grows with  , reaching almost full 
cooperation for  = 0.5 and higher. The differences in payoff are large for small  , whereas upon increasing  
the influence of the score on the payoffs becomes very limited. As regards norm internalization, it increases 
with  , as can be seen in Fig. 5: internalization is higher for larger values of  , reaching values similar to those 
of the exogenously constrained model. We believe that these results arise from the fact for such limited range 
of scores they are no longer decisive to decide the outcome of the fights. In this model, most agents have zero 
Figure 5.  Top to bottom: Histograms of scores aggregated over all groups; blue indicates free riders (that do 
not follow the norm of cooperating), red indicates norm followers (cooperators). Payoff as a function of the 
score; line is the result of a linear regression. Final distributions of scores for different values of  . Internalization 
attribute evolution for different values of  . Left to right,  = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75.
9
Vol.:(0123456789)
Scientific RepoRtS |        (2020) 10:15359  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-71664-w
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
score, particularly for large  , and therefore fights are not so relevant anymore, as most participants randomly 
win half of them. This is in contrast with the exogenously constrained model, where agents are concentrated in 
the minimum and maximum values, and they win every fight with the lower half of the population.
The changes in the results when group size increases up to n = 24 can be seen in Fig. 6. While the distribu-
tion of scores is very similar to the case of small groups, the dependence of payoffs on scores is essentially the 
same as before. As for the behavior concerning norm internalization, it is the opposite to the one observed in 
Fig. 5: when  increases, the attribute η is less internalized. At the same time, the cooperation level is very high 
for all values of  . We believe that for large groups, the large  results are comparable to those in Ref.48. Given 
that most individuals are equal, fights become statistically irrelevant, and therefore the situation is similar to 
that model, with no fights and no punishment. Thus, in agreement with this previous work, we see very little 
norm internalization for large groups with endogenously constrained scores. The results from the individual 
groups (cf. Figs. S15 and S16 in the SI) agree in general with this picture; the fact that the mobility between ranks 
is somewhat lower for larger groups (cf. Figs. S17 and S18) may also be another reason for the smaller norm 
internalization in that case.
Discussion
In this paper, we have introduced an agent-based model showing how a hierarchical structure may emerge in 
a population of initially egalitarian individuals, and how this structure affects within-group cooperation. As 
we have seen, the emergence of hierarchies is a robust feature of the model observed in both versions we con-
sidered in our research: unconstrained or constrained scores, and both for small or large groups. The specific 
score structure and other features of the model do depend on the version of interest. Thus, when score values 
are unconstrained, leading to substantial, time-independent probabilities of winning (or losing) fights, payoffs 
and ranking are very correlated: the higher the score, the larger the payoffs, for small and large groups, which 
Figure 6.  Simulation results for large groups, n = 24 . Top to bottom: Histograms of scores aggregated over all 
groups; blue indicates free riders (that do not follow the norm of cooperating), red indicates norm followers 
(cooperators). Payoff as a function of the score; line is the result of a linear regression. Final distributions 
of scores for different values of  . Internalization attribute evolution for different values of  . Left to right, 
 = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75.
10
Vol:.(1234567890)
Scientific RepoRtS |        (2020) 10:15359  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-71664-w
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
is a characteristic of hierarchical structures. Cooperation is limited to lowest score individuals, and about half 
of the individuals cooperate. This takes place without any internalization of the norm whatsoever and arises 
because of purely material interest, i.e., agents try to maximize their payoff by generating resources even if they 
might be robbed via fights.
On the other hand, when we impose an external constraint on the scores, avoiding indefinite growth of fight 
capability, society becomes structured, polarized, in fact, with most individuals being either at the top or the 
bottom of the ranking. This structure turns out to be compatible with high cooperation levels. However, contrary 
to the unconstrained model, in this case, cooperation takes place via norm internalization. It is also observed 
that the degree of norm internalization is smaller for larger groups, and in this case, it is internalized mostly by 
lowest-ranked individuals. In this society, individuals experience rapid transitions between scores: when they 
go down in the hierarchy, they cooperate because the individuals who are higher than them in the hierarchy 
can take the payoffs from them, and they cannot reciprocate. In turn, this leads to norm internalization when 
individuals experience a phase of having low scores. Interestingly, an interpretation of these results is that this 
dynamical hierarchy can play the role of the punishment phase in Ref.48.
We have also introduced the possibility that constraints arise endogenously, decaying when individuals do not 
fight. In this case, norm internalization takes place also for small groups, and it is not an artifact of the arbitrarily 
imposed limits. The structure of the society is different in this case, with a large fraction of the population living 
in the region of intermediate scores. In the case of larger groups, this makes fights practically irrelevant, as many 
individuals win or lose them 50% of the times, making the model comparable to that studied in Ref.48, where the 
norm did not internalize for large groups.
Generally speaking, all three versions of the model produce hierarchical structures in small groups, but only 
when scores are constrained, be it exogenously or endogenously, there is a sizable degree of norm internaliza-
tion. As was the case in Ref.48 (in the so called us-vs-them situation, competition between groups) larger groups 
pose more difficulties to norm internalization, although in the case of the exogenously constrained model this 
occurs to a lesser extent. Therefore, the main conclusion we can draw from our models is that it is possible to 
observe a transition from an egalitarian society—with all individuals ranked equally—to another one where 
there is a hierarchy, but, at the same time, there are high levels of cooperation. We want to stress that this 
does not occur only for a very restricted set of parameters and attributes, but coexistence of cooperation and 
hierarchy arises in a wide range of values. Thus, we varied the group sizes ( n = 8, 16, 24 ), the multiplier of the 
collective effort ( b = 2, 4 ), the value of cooperation of the utility function ( ν = 1, 1.5 ), the probability that the 
winner of the fights is the one with the higher rank (0.9, 0.75, 0.5), including changing the dependence of the 
probability on the rank, the probability to revise the strategy ( µ = 0.9, 0.75, 0.5 ), and the error rate of optimiza-
tion ( e = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 ). Finally, we also studied different choices for the decay parameter in the endogenously 
constrained model (  = 0.1, 0.25, 0.4, 0.5, 0.75, 0.8 ), and the cost of optimizing the payoffs and the cost of inter-
nalizing the norm ( copt = cint = 0.1, 0.25 ). The number of parameters makes it very cumbersome to carry out a 
full sensitivity analysis, but we believe that these checks allows us to be confident that the outcome of the model 
is very general and not strongly dependent on the parameters.
Our finding that hierarchy can arise in a cooperative society is in contrast with the experimental observation 
that hierarchy might be detrimental for cooperation in Ref.40, but consistent with the fact that cooperation may 
be compatible with rankings arising from cooperative  action41. Interestingly, the main difference between the 
nature of fights in our model and in Ref. 40 is the lack of feedback from fights to hierarchy in the latter: experi-
ments were carried with a fixed score assigned to each individual. This strongly suggests that a key feature behind 
the coexistence of hierarchy and cooperation may be the dynamic character of the score. Besides, at least for 
small groups with a realistic (constrained) ranking system, this may require an additional ingredient, namely 
the possibility of internalizing a norm that favors cooperativeness. In this respect, our model is aligned with 
recent  work51 showing that societies developed in regions where agriculture—i.e., solving the collective action 
problem—was practiced for longer, providing more time for norms to emerge, and conflicts were more intense 
creating a stronger selection pressure. Further research is needed to assess appropriately the mechanisms allowing 
cooperation in strongly hierarchical societies, and we hope that this paper stimulates such research.
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